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Just months after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, New Orleans held a mayoral election. With so many displaced 
residents, it was difficult to gauge attitudes, but there are perhaps few more important situations in which the 
public’s attitudes need to be examined. This paper examines the methodological challenges with survey research in 
the aftermath of a natural disaster. We conducted a traditional survey just days before the election and attempted to 
correct for our inability to reach particular segments of the population through post-stratification weights. The results 
of our poll were relatively accurate for all of the candidates but one – the winner. We recommend in the aftermath 
of a disaster that researchers provide not only a range of possible outcomes, but also that they should consider other 
methods, such as focus groups, and alter the usual questions to account for the post-disaster context. Given that the 
opinion environment after a major disaster is marked by indecision and confusion, it is not surprising that 
respondents were unsure of their vote choice and/or changed their mind just before the election. Our experience 
should provide some caution to researchers seeking to measure opinion in these circumstances. 
 
 
 
   n 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused extensive damage in New Orleans and led nearly everyone in the city to evacuate 
for periods lasting from weeks to months. Six months after the disaster, with still thousands of residents living in 
temporary locations both inside and outside the city, New Orleans held a mayoral election. Since preexisting estimates 
of the city’s population size and demographics were rendered unreliable, it was extremely difficult to accurately 
measure public opinion about the election, including voters’ preferences about the candidates and the important issues 
related to recovery. Into this uncertain situation we saw the opportunity not only to try to assess public opinion about 
a mayoral election, but also to analyze the methodological obstacles to collecting data in situations in which the sample 
is hard to reach and the population is in a state of rapid flux. 
 From a methodological standpoint, one of the challenges is that disasters can disrupt the population so much 
that pre-disaster estimates are no longer useful. When a substantial proportion of the population loses their homes and 
is displaced, how do candidates, pollsters, and elected officials gauge their attitudes?  This question is not only relevant 
to pre-election polls, but also in measuring survivors’ attitudes about recovery policies and their individual coping 
strategies.  Furthermore, it is often difficult to reach the sample with traditional phone or internet surveys due to utility 
outages and population displacement. 
 These issues are not unique to this case. Natural disasters of various types are ubiquitous, and elections often 
take place as communities recover from floods, blizzards, tornadoes, wildfires, or hurricanes.  For example, voters in 
Chicago had to go to the polls in late February 1979 to cast ballots in a primary election for mayor mere weeks after 
a massive winter storm blanketed Chicago with record low temperatures and over two feet of snow.  Hurricane Andrew 
in 1992 and four major hurricanes in 2004 pounded Florida’s coast in the months preceding presidential elections. In 
2012, voters along the Atlantic Coast had to participate in federal elections just two weeks after Hurricane Sandy 
caused serious damage throughout the region. Indeed, given the United States’ large number of elections and its wide 
susceptibility to natural disasters, there are many examples. And, if climate scientists are correct about the increasing 
number and severity of disasters, the cases are likely to increase. 
 This paper describes our efforts to conduct polling in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as 
the city prepared for municipal elections.  We hope our findings shed light not only on issues of post-Katrina New 
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Orleans recovery, but also more broadly on useful lessons for those who hope to assess public opinion as part of a 
recovery effort following future natural disasters.  To those ends, we begin by reviewing the scholarly literature on how 
natural disasters influence voting behavior.  We continue by describing the efforts by numerous researchers to 
measure public opinion in the aftermath of Katrina, paying particular attention to their estimates of the racial 
composition of New Orleans.  Using these estimates as a guide, we describe the methodology we employed to survey 
New Orleans voters in advance of the April 2006 mayoral primary.  We then compare the results of our survey to the 
election results. We conclude with guidance for others working in situations similar to ours. 
 
Political Behavior and Disasters 
 Most of the social science and public policy work on disasters examines individuals’ psychological responses 
and coping mechanisms, societal responses such as acts of altruism and solidarity, policies on mitigation and recovery, 
and issues of inequality and injustice. However, there are important reasons to analyze the effect that disasters have 
on politics, including political behavior. Disasters can affect voting behavior in elections that immediately follow the 
event, but only to the extent that voters hold elected officials responsible for preparation and response to these events. 
Voters often utilize retrospective evaluations to reward or punish candidates and are capable of holding elected officials 
accountable based on their performance in office (Key 1966; Kramer 1971; Fiorina 1981; Malhotra and Kuo 2008).  
Attributions of responsibility vary by the incumbent’s level of office, partisanship, and voters’ levels of political 
sophistication (Gomez and Wilson 2008) as well as by the accessibility of information about the issue on which voters 
are asked to assess blame (Bartels 2008; Healy and Lenz 2014). For example, Maestas et al. show that people who were 
more attentive to news coverage about Hurricane Katrina, especially Republicans, were more likely to believe that the 
state’s failure to call the federal government for help was instrumental in the time it took to get aid to New Orleans 
(2008). This literature, however, has not taken on the fact that there are significant methodological hurdles to assessing 
public opinion in the aftermath of a major disaster. 
 In an early and groundbreaking study, Abney and Hill demonstrated that voters did not believe the incumbent 
mayor of New Orleans was responsible for the flooding after Hurricane Betsy in 1965. The mayor was reelected by a 
thin margin just months after the storm (1966). The researchers had “neither the time nor the money to sample the 
entire city” and limited their interviews to five precincts comparable across racial and socioeconomic conditions 
(Abney and Hill 1966, 975). Three of the precincts had no flooding and two of them had significant flooding. They 
conducted their surveys in person by going door-to-door, thereby avoiding problems with phone service and power 
outages, however they did not address the likelihood that response rates were undoubtedly lower in the “wet” precincts. 
 A more recent study examines voters’ attitudes in Houston after Tropical Storm Allison flooded parts of the 
city in 2001. Voters who believed the city was responsible for flood protection were willing to punish the incumbent 
mayor (Arceneaux and Stein 2006). Though this study was conducted within three months of a severe storm that 
caused $5 billion in damage, the destruction paled compared to Katrina. Approximately 30,000 people became 
homeless as a result of Allison, or about 1.5 percent of the Houston’s population, compared to nearly 80 percent in 
New Orleans following Katrina.  Researchers did not take extraordinary efforts to deal with sampling problems 
primarily because such a small portion of the population was displaced. 
 Other analyses avoid the difficulty of in-person interviews and ensure universal coverage of precincts by 
analyzing aggregate data.  Aggregate analyses tend to show that events as wide ranging as droughts, floods, tornadoes, 
and shark attacks are associated with declines in vote share for incumbent parties (Achen and Bartels 2004; Healy and 
Malhotra 2009, 2010; Gasper and Reeves 2011). Looking at turnout rather than vote returns, Sinclair et al. (2011) 
demonstrate that Hurricane Katrina had a depressing effect on turnout in the 2006 election, but that those who lived in 
the most heavily damaged areas were actually the most motivated to vote because of the dynamics of the campaign. 
 In the aftermath of other natural disasters, polling firms and university polling centers have mostly chosen not 
to change their sampling methodology. The University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll did not change its methodology after 
the flooding in 2008, even though thousands of residents were displaced from their homes for months.  Although there 
was some discussion at Gallup and other polling firms about discontinuing national polling operations after Hurricane 
Sandy destroyed homes along the New Jersey coast and Staten Island in 2012, ultimately pollsters forged ahead.  Most 
polls of local residents utilized post-stratification weights to correct for under sampling devastated areas. Online 
information from the Marist poll, Siena College poll, Rutgers Eagleton poll, and Quinnipiac University poll 
documents that after Hurricane Sandy, each weighted the data according to 2010 Census figures. In doing so, they did 
not assume that the underlying population would change significantly, but rather that most of those who left would 
return or that those who remained were not significantly different from those who were displaced. 
 In summary, disasters can alter public opinion and voting behavior and as such, when elections take place in 
the weeks or months after a major natural event, it is necessary for researchers, candidates and the media to try to 
gauge voters’ attitudes. However, there are serious methodological obstacles to collecting these data. Depending on 
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the scope of the damage, it may not be appropriate to use traditional polling and sampling methods, as they will not 
allow for accurate estimates of the population’s opinions. The 2006 New Orleans mayoral election is a good case 
study for examining these methodological issues. 
 
 
Katrina and New Orleans Population Estimates 
 On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall just east of New Orleans, causing massive levee 
breaches around the city. New Orleans flooded nearly completely, as it is a virtual bowl, located largely below sea 
level and sandwiched between Lake Pontchartrain to the north and the Mississippi River to the south. Although nearly 
80 percent of New Orleans’ population evacuated before the storm and the majority of the remaining residents were 
evacuated or forced to leave afterward, the hurricane directly caused the deaths of more than 1,800 residents. Because 
of the city’s geography, nearly every drop of water that came in through levee breaches had to be pumped out, forcing 
survivors to wait several weeks before they could return. Residents returned in phases, with those who sustained the 
least damage coming back first. 
 In spite of the fact that residents were scattered across the region, the city was forced by court order to 
schedule its regular mayoral primary election for April 22, 2006.1  In the weeks before the election, the key unknown 
was the composition of the electorate. Many New Orleans residents lived in temporary homes in or near the city and 
others lived in Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, Memphis, and Baton Rouge.  By the spring of 2006, only about 60 percent 
of pre-Katrina utility customers had services; only three of nine hospitals were open and only about a quarter of the 
physicians were practicing; residential mail service was nonexistent; both landline and cellular service was still spotty; 
and less than a third of the city’s public schools had reopened (Rackleff 2007). 
 As is common after disasters, the City of New Orleans calculated rapid population estimates to get an idea 
of the new, post-disaster population (Grais et al. 2006). Through a complex process of stratified, geographic sampling 
and door-to-door surveys, these estimates suggested that in late-January, 2006, about 181,400 people lived in New 
Orleans (about 37 percent of the pre-Katrina population).  Most experts agreed that this estimate was low; it did not 
include individuals living in non-residential structures nor did it count those living in temporary homes just outside 
the city. 
 Importantly, for the purposes of pre-election polling, the estimates did not break the population down by race 
(Stone et al. 2006). Racial composition is a key factor for voting in New Orleans (Lay 2009); the city has an extensive 
history of racially polarized voting and opinion (Liu and Vanderleeuw 2007). There were two main ideas about the 
composition of the electorate. A Brown University study released in early 2006 predicted that the electorate would be 
majority White and with significantly higher incomes than before (Logan 2006). By combining 2000 Census data 
with federal damage assessment maps, the study suggested that if only the undamaged areas of New Orleans were 
rebuilt, the city could lose as much as 80 percent of its African America population and 50 percent of its White 
population. A few weeks later, a local consulting group predicted that the electorate would still be majority African 
American (Thevenot 2006). This study compared voter registration lists with change-of-address filings with the U.S. 
Postal Service and found that about 80 percent of pre-Katrina registered voters were potentially living in the New 
Orleans metro area and the racial composition was very similar to its pre-Katrina proportions. 
 There were few polls taken in New Orleans in the months following Katrina. Loyola University’s Institute 
of Politics conducted two polls in advance of the mayoral primary, one in late January/early February 2006, and the 
other in late March, about three weeks before Election Day.  Each poll reported the results of interviews with 400 
registered voters in the City of New Orleans contacted by landline telephone.  In both cases, there was difficulty 
reaching respondents who were roughly 60 percent white and 40 percent African American. They chose to weight the 
data evenly by race (Ritea and Eggler 2006; Krupa and Donze 2006). 
 The Gallup Organization (co-sponsored by CNN and USA Today) conducted a pilot study on February 4-5, 
2006.  They saw the lack of landline phone service as the chief obstacle to getting an accurate sample.  The state’s 
main phone company, BellSouth, estimated that at that time, there were still 144,000 households in New Orleans 
without phone service.  Gallup believed the appropriate solution was to supplement a landline sample with a cellular 
phone sample. Most research indicates dual-frame samples are not methodologically problematic and that there are 
similar population estimates between cell phone and landline samples (Brick et al. 2006; Keeter et al. 2007; Kennedy 
and Everett 2011), but some have shown significant differences between the populations (Blumberg and Luke 2007; 
Carley-Baxter et al. 2010). 
                                                          
1 Louisiana has non-partisan primary elections. All candidates are listed on the same ballot. If one candidate receives 
a majority in the primary, he or she is declared the winner. If no candidate receives a majority, a run-off election is 
held a month later between the top two vote-getters. 
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 Until very recently, the cell-only group has generally been younger and lower-income than landline users, 
but as cell phone use grows and landline use declines, this is changing (Peytchev and Neely 2013). There is no research, 
however, on using a cell phone sample in the period following a natural disaster.  One study shows that many New 
Orleans residents became more reliant on their cell phones after Katrina, largely because it was the only semi-reliable 
form of communication and even then, primarily only through text message (Shklovski et al. 2010). 
 In their pilot study, Gallup discovered the working rate for landline telephone numbers in their sample was 
only 22 percent, about one-third of the working rate in a typical national sample. They were able to get a working rate 
of 69 percent on cell phones, and the response rates between cell phone respondents and landline respondents were 
nearly identical (56 and 55 percent, respectively). Gallup’s final sample of 804 respondents included 64 percent by 
cell phone and 36 percent by landline. Landline respondents were slightly more likely to cooperate (59% to 50%). 
There were few demographic differences and there were no substantive attitudinal differences between the two 
samples (Jones 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Methodologies of Post-Katrina Pre-election Polls 
 Dates Sample 
Size 
Margin 
of Error 
Mode Post-Stratification 
Weights 
Loyola University Institute of 
Politics 
1/26/06-
2/13/06 
400 4.7% Landline Race (50/50 
White/Black) 
Gallup 2/18/06-
2/26/06 
804 4.0% Landline + 
Cellphone 
Adjusted for prob. of 
inclusion based on # of 
telephone #s & # of 
people 
Loyola University Institute of 
Politics 
3/23/06-
3/28/06 
400 4.7% Landline Race (50/50 
White/Black) 
Our Primary Election Data 4/15/06-
4/17/06 
571 4.1% Landline Multiple weights used 
 
 The fact that there was no consensus about the underlying population of New Orleans meant there was 
enormous uncertainty about the upcoming election.  How many and which people would vote?  Would the electorate 
change significantly because so many people were displaced?  Would residents travel to the city in order to vote?  
Moreover, did displaced residents still consider themselves to be New Orleanians, or had they moved not just 
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physically but psychologically?  The uncertainty had serious implications for the campaign, in part because many 
African American residents feared that they were about to lose power and many Whites believed that for the first time 
in a generation, they could win back the mayor’s office. The uncertainty also, of course, had implications for 
researchers wishing to analyze public opinion.  The sample was going to be difficult to reach because of the lack of 
utility services.  The population was dynamic and yet, if residents were to be involved in the recovery process, officials 
would have to find a way to understand what the people wanted. 
 
Our Methods 
 In the weeks before Election Day, the common perception was that the race was a close contest between the 
African American incumbent, Ray Nagin, and two White candidates: Mitch Landrieu, sitting Lt. Governor; and Ron 
Forman, a local businessman. The Gallup poll conducted in February showed Landrieu and Nagin were tied with 18 
percent each, but the plurality of respondents (40 percent) was undecided.  Loyola’s March survey showed that Nagin 
and Landrieu were tied for the lead, each with about a quarter of respondents and about 23 percent of voters were 
undecided. Forman was third, but people believed his support was growing. With no polls since early March, we 
believed it was important to collect data because voters’ perceptions of the contest influence turnout and vote choice 
(Blais and Bodet 2006; Gimpel and Harvey 1997).  The absence of this information could create incorrect assumptions 
on the part of voters as well as candidates and policymakers. 
 Our survey used Interactive Voice Response (IVR) to call landlines in New Orleans.  In contrast to the more 
expensive Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI), IVR significantly reduces costs because no call center 
is necessary.  There are several other benefits of using IVR.  First, it reduces social desirability bias (Turner et al. 
1998; Newman et al. 2002; Kreuter et al. 2008).  Lind et al. (2013) suggest that respondents are more likely to report 
true opinions rather than socially desirable ones when “questioned by computers (rather) than by interviewers” (889) 
because they “wish to avoid embarrassing interviewer reactions and other potentially harmful consequences…” (908). 
Further, because IVR is cheaper, it allows for the collection of larger sample sizes; in our case, this was an important 
advantage because we needed a larger sample so that we could rely on weighting techniques to correct for sample 
biases resulting from the lack of landline phone service in New Orleans.  Fortunately, comparisons of IVR to CATI 
show few significant differences (Midanik and Greenfield 2010).  One drawback to IVR, as compared to CATI, is an 
increase in nonresponse error; it is easier for respondents to drop out (Tourangeau et al. 2002; Sakshaug et al. 2010).  
However recent analyses of the accuracy of CATI and IVR polling reveal that both methods are acceptable (AAPOR 
2009). 
 We used a generic vote choice question and a screen for whether respondents planned to vote in the mayoral 
election.2
  
Surveys were administered to randomly-selected residential landlines in Orleans Parish on April 15-17, 
2006. Despite drop-off throughout the survey, we obtained 966 responses to at least one question in the survey (65 
percent response rate) and 333 responses that fully completed the one-minute telephone survey (22 percent). As we 
expected, the sample was not an accurate representation of the racial composition of the population. Seventy-five 
percent of our sample was White, 18 percent was African American and 7 percent was another race. 
 O’Neill et al. argue that it is acceptable to use post-stratification weights based on a characteristic that is 
correlated to the vote and is available for both the population and the sample (2002). Post-stratification weights adjust 
for nonresponse or noncoverage in order that the weighted survey more accurately represents the population of 
inference. Their use assumes that those included in the survey with a particular characteristic – in this case, racial 
identity – have similar attitudes as those excluded from the survey. They are commonly used in surveys conducted 
over the phone or Internet to adjust for the population that does not have access to these devices (Dever et al. 2008). 
In most cases, the adjustments are minimal, but “when there is sizeable noncoverage and/or nonresponse involved, 
the adjustments can be substantial; in this case the adjustments are used to reduce the bias of the survey estimates, 
but standard errors for estimates unrelated to the adjustment variables may be increased” (Kalton and Flores-Cervantes 
2003, 82). 
 Although methodologists caution against significantly altering the sample after the fact through the use of 
weights, obtaining a less biased sample would have required extraordinary efforts. One could have, for example, gone 
door-to-door to get around the problems of a lack of utility services. However, in March and April, 2006, most of the 
flooded neighborhoods were still largely abandoned. A door-to-door search would have found many empty, moldy 
homes and in some cases, no doors on which to knock. A cell phone sample would have helped to reach some displaced 
                                                          
2 Our question: “If the New Orleans mayoral election were held today, would you vote for…?” Several candidates 
names were then listed one at a time and respondents stated “no” or “yes.” Gallup’s question: “For each of the 
following candidates for mayor, please tell me whether you will definitely vote for that person. How about…?” 
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voters, but it would have been prohibitively expensive. 
 The major problem with weighting the data, however, was that it requires that population totals for the 
explanatory variables be known from an external source. As stated, no one was sure what the racial composition of 
the city or the electorate would be in this first election after Katrina. Thus, traditional survey methods resulted in 
biased samples, and a common method of correcting the bias was compromised because we lacked solid figures on 
the current racial composition of the population.  Our solution to this problem was to create multiple weights based 
on the two population estimates reported at that time, including the Brown University report and the local consultant’s 
estimate. This way, we did not assume we understood more about the underlying population than we actually did. 
Results would be reported along a range and contingent upon the weights used. 
 The Brown study estimated the city could have lost 80 percent of the Black population and 50 percent of the 
White population. It did not estimate an effect on the other racial groups; to account for voters of other races, we 
estimated that population lost 65 percent of its pre-Katrina population. A large portion of New Orleanians who are 
neither Black nor White are Vietnamese-American, and though this population suffered substantial flooding and 
displacement, they also returned in more significant numbers than many poor Blacks. Thus, we estimated that their 
return rate would have been between that of the White and African American population.  This results in an electorate 
46 percent Black, 48 percent white, and 6 percent other races.  This was very similar to the 50/50 distribution used by 
Loyola University’s Institute of Politics. The other weighting technique was that of the local consultant, who estimated 
that the population after the storm would be similar to the pre-Katrina population. As such, the racial composition of 
the last mayoral election in 2002 was 62 percent Black, 35 percent White, and 3 percent other races. 
 
Results 
 Table 2 presents the results of our poll based on different weighting scenarios as well as the election results. 
The raw data were within the margin of error for a two of the minor candidates: Rob Couhig and Tom Watson. Couhig 
was the only Republican in the race and garnered most of his support from fellow residents of Lakeview, a mostly 
White upper- and middle-class community that suffered severe flooding. Of those whose homes were most heavily 
damaged, these residents were some of the first to return and begin rebuilding. As such, they were easier to reach than 
others who suffered similar or worse levels of flooding. Watson is an African American minister, but was not seen as 
a viable alternative to Nagin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Weighting Scenarios Based on Multiple Post-Katrina Population Estimates of Racial Composition 
 
Candidates Our Raw Data Brown 
Weights 
45/48/61 
’02 Election 
Weights 
62/35/31 
’06 Election 
Weights 
53/42/51 
2006 Primary 
Results 
Couhig 14.5% 
(83) 
13.3% 12.3% 12.8% 10% 
Forman 24.7% 18.4% 14.8% 16.7% 17% 
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(141) 
Landrieu 24.0% 
(137) 
25.7% 26.8% 26.2% 29% 
Nagin 11.7% 
(67) 
20.8% 25.9% 23.1% 38% 
Watson 0.4% 
(2) 
1.0% 1.2% 1.1% 1% 
Other 4.0% 
(23) 
3.6% 3.4% 3.5% 5% 
Undecided 20.7% 
(118) 
17.2% 15.6% 16.5% -- 
 Total N=571     
1 Weights presented in order of %Black, %White, and %Other Races 
 
 The unweighted results were only slightly outside the margin of error for Ron Forman and Mitch Landrieu, 
the two White candidates believed to be the incumbent’s major competition. Forman was most heavily supported by 
White residents living in Uptown, an area of the city that did not suffer significant flooding and consists primarily of 
middle- and upper-income residents. Landrieu’s support was more widespread and he ultimately came in second to 
Nagin. Our unweighted results were most inaccurate with regard to Nagin’s support. His support came mostly from 
Black voters. Because the African American community suffered disproportionately in the flood and were so much 
more difficult to reach with traditional survey methods, they were under-represented in the poll. 
 In weighting the data according to racial composition, weighting techniques that assume higher White 
populations produce higher levels of support for Couhig and Forman and lower support for Nagin. If the actual racial 
composition in the election had been closer to 46/48/6, Forman would have been a stronger contender. Landrieu’s 
support was much less contingent on the weighting scenario than any of the others. The poll shows him leading Nagin 
under all scenarios, including the one based on the 2002 electorate’s composition in which African Americans were 
a significant majority. 
 Ultimately, the racial composition of the 2006 primary electorate was 53 percent Black, 42 percent White, 
and 5 percent other races. Had we had a crystal ball to foresee this, the poll would have produced results within the 
margin of error for all candidates except Nagin, the eventual first place finisher. Under this weighting scenario 
Landrieu was still predicted to finish first, followed closely by Nagin and Forman.  Furthermore, nearly seventeen 
percent of the population would have been categorized as undecided using these weights. 
 Why did the poll so substantially under-estimate Nagin’s support? He came in first in the primary, garnering 
38 percent of the vote, but none of the weighting scenarios show him in the lead. One problem is that the African 
Americans who were surveyed were not entirely representative of those who actually voted. Blacks who were surveyed 
had landline phone service and thus, were not as poor as those who could not be included in the sample. Indeed, 42 
percent of African Americans in the sample reported no flooding at their home, a figure much lower than the 80 percent 
of Black residents in the population that experienced some flooding. Even allowing that a significant portion of these 
residents did not vote in the 2006 election because of disinterest or displacement, it is likely the case that the African 
Americans in our sample were systematically different from primary voters. Given that we now know Nagin received 
most of his support from predominantly-Black precincts, this helps explain why the poll underestimated his level of 
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support. 
 Another reason the poll miscalculated Nagin’s support was that nearly 20 percent of respondents said they 
were undecided about whom to support. This portion undoubtedly included some respondents who were not interested 
in or closely following the elections as well as some who had a preference but did not wish to reveal it in the survey; 
it also likely included some voters who were genuinely stumped. African American voters had not supported Nagin 
in 2002 and before Katrina, they did not generally approve of his job performance. However, the 2006 campaign 
became viewed through the lens of a potential White “power grab,” when Blacks feared Whites were going to take 
advantage of the fact that so many African Americans were displaced and could not vote. In fact, Sinclair et al. (2011) 
show this belief helped to mobilize the Black community. Thus, there were likely many African American voters who 
held their noses and voted for Nagin, but did not decide to do so until the last minute, or who were unwilling to reveal 
this choice in a survey. For their part, the White community was split primarily between Forman and Landrieu, so it 
is possible that some of the undecided voters were Whites who had not made up their minds about which candidate to 
support. 
 We present our results in Table 3 with the exclusion of the undecided voters. The presence of a “don’t know” 
or “undecided” option does not influence the substantive distribution when the “don’t knows” are excluded (Presser 
and Schuman 1980). Mitofsky (1998) offers alternatives for allocating the “undecideds,” including excluding them 
altogether. He also argues one could allocate the “undecided” evenly between the two parties or allocate them all to 
the challenger, but because this was a multi-candidate race where partisanship had little influence, neither of these 
were viable options. We chose not to allocate the “undecided” proportionally because it seemed clear to us that voters 
were not equally undecided between all the candidates, but rather had narrowed their choices down to two – either 
Forman or Landrieu, or Nagin or Landrieu, dependent largely on the respondent’s race. 
 Excluding the undecided voters, Nagin’s proportion comes closest to his actual total in the election when we 
assume the racial composition of the electorate will match the previous electorate – when African Americans make 
up a substantial majority. Even these results under- estimate his eventual levels of support. If we had weighted the 
data according to the actual racial composition of the 2006 electorate, we would have predicted Nagin’s total portion 
would have been even less. We cannot be sure how much of the poll’s under-representation of Nagin’s support is 
due to issues with the representativeness of African Americans in the sample, or whether a significant portion of New 
Orleans voters decided in the final days to vote for the incumbent. 
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Table 3: Weighting Scenarios Based on Multiple Post-Katrina Population Estimates of Racial Composition – 
Excluding Undecided Voters 
 
Candidates Our Raw Data Brown 
Weights 
45/48/61 
’02 Election 
Weights 
62/35/31 
’06 Election 
Weights 
53/42/51 
2006 Primary 
Results 
Couhig 14.5% 
(83) 
16.1% 14.6% 15.4% 10% 
Forman 24.7% 
(141) 
22.3% 17.5% 20.1% 17% 
Landrieu 24.0% 
(137) 
31.1% 31.8% 31.4% 29% 
Nagin 11.7% 
(67) 
25.1% 30.7% 27.7% 38% 
Watson 0.4% 
(2) 
1.2% 1.5% 1.3% 1% 
Other 4.0% 
(23) 
4.3% 4.0% 4.2% 5% 
 Total N=571     
1 Weights presented in order of %Black, %White, and %Other Races 
 
 We should also note that because we sampled landlines, we were unable to interview any residents who were 
living outside New Orleans but voted by absentee ballot. City and state officials made significant efforts to allow New 
Orleans voters to cast their ballots from outside the city. Satellite polling centers were located near cities with large 
numbers of evacuees, and ballots were allowed to be submitted by mail and fax. Had we been able to include a sample 
of this population in the poll, it is possible Nagin’s support would have been higher, however the election results do 
not indicate it would have made a significant difference. Nagin won a plurality of the absentee votes (38 percent), but 
Landrieu came in not far behind with 35.5 percent; even Forman earned a significant portion of displaced voters (16.5 
percent). 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The results of our poll, conducted just a few days before the election, did not accurately predict the outcome 
that Nagin would win. Even with a variety of weighting scenarios, mathematical correction cannot overcome a sample 
in which a demographic group known to have an important impact on local politics is distinct from its underlying 
population. However, the relative accuracy of the weighted predictions for the remaining candidates was remarkable 
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given the uncertainty that surrounded efforts to estimate the racial makeup of New Orleans in early 2006.  It is these 
two results – the accuracy of the predictions for most of the candidates and the inaccuracy of the prediction for the 
eventual winner – that lead us to a few important recommendations for researchers measuring public opinion following 
disasters. 
 First, when a disaster displaces a significant portion of the population, especially when the effects are not 
equally distributed across important demographic groups, we believe researchers should develop multiple weighting 
techniques and report results along a range of opinion.  One option would be to use pre-disaster estimates as a guide; 
this can serve as a good starting point and is obviously most appropriate when all relevant demographic groups are 
equally displaced by the natural disaster. Additional options may present themselves as other researchers – 
commercial, political, and academic – also attempt to describe the population in the wake of a natural disaster. Thus, 
it is best to present multiple sets of results based on the different techniques, and researchers should emphasize the 
higher level of trust they place in findings that are consistent across the different weighting schemes.  In our case, 
however, multiple weighting scenarios would not have completely solved the problems associated with the biased 
sample. 
 As such, it may not be possible with a widespread disaster to use traditional polling techniques and obtain 
accurate results.  When so many people are displaced; when they do not have access to utility services; when they do not 
know where “home” really is, it may be better and more accurate to use other forms of data collection than to rely on 
phone surveys. Focus groups, panel studies, face-to-face interviews are all potential options that could have helped us 
get a closer approximation of actual opinion in the population. These methods are, of course, more time-consuming and 
expensive than a traditional phone survey, but if we had chosen to supplement our survey will ongoing focus groups, we 
might have better understood how the attitudes of the poorer, displaced African American population were so 
significantly different from the less poor African American population we were able to survey. Future research should 
consider multiple methods of data collection that includes, but is not limited to, traditional survey research. 
 Finally, the results here also suggest that the post-Katrina situation led to a more dynamic opinion environment. 
There were high numbers of undecided voters because people were generally struggling with significant choices on a 
regular basis, only one of which was their vote for mayor. Where would I live?  Was my old job still available?  Where 
will my friends and family live?  Will I be able to send my children to school, and where?  Is it safe to stay in the city?  
Katrina and other major disasters lead to a high level of confusion and indecision, along with resulting anxiety and 
psychological distress.  Polling is, after all, only a snapshot of attitudes at a given time.  In an environment where people 
regularly change their minds, either because of their own confusion or because the situation demands it, the usefulness 
of polling may be limited. Researchers should attempt to gauge how confident respondents are about their answers so 
that they can judge how confident they should be in their results. If we had followed our sample across several weeks of 
the campaign, we might have seen how and when undecided voters ultimately came to their decision. 
 In conclusion, it is important to try to understand public opinion after a disaster.  Elected officials need to know 
where the public stands on the myriad issues surrounding recovery.  But, researchers should be aware of the potential 
pitfalls and try to adapt their methods to account for the changes in the population resulting from the disaster.  More than 
any other recommendation we can offer is that researchers should not be overly confident that they have accurately 
captured the population’s views in an environment where not only are people changing their mind more often than usual, 
but the population itself changes rapidly as people come and go in the wake of a major disaster. 
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